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Abstract
Distributed clusters like the Grid and PlanetLab
enable the same statistical multiplexing efficiency
gains for computing as the Internet provides for net-
working. One major challenge is allocating resources
in an economically efficient and low-latency way. A
common solution is proportional share, where users
each get resources in proportion to their pre-defined
weight. However, this does not allow users to differ-
entiate the value of their jobs. This leads to economic
inefficiency. In contrast, systems that require reser-
vations impose a high latency (typically minutes to
hours) to acquire resources.
We present Tycoon, a market based distributed
resource allocation system based on proportional
share. The key advantages of Tycoon are that it al-
lows users to differentiate the value of their jobs, its
resource acquisition latency is limited only by com-
munication delays, and it imposes no manual bidding
overhead on users. We present experimental results
using a prototype implementation of our design.
1 Introduction
A key advantage of distributed systems like the Grid
[13] and PlanetLab [1] is their ability to pool to-
gether shared computational resources. This allows
increased throughput because of statistical multi-
plexing and the bursty utilization pattern of typi-
cal users. Sharing nodes that are dispersed in the
network allows lower delay because applications can
store data close to users. Finally, sharing allows
greater reliability because of redundancy in hosts
and network connections.
The key issue for shared resources is allocation.
One solution is to add more capacity. If resources
are already optimally allocated, then this is the only
solution, albeit a costly one. In all other cases, allo-
cation and additional capacity are complementary.
In addition, in peer-to-peer systems where organi-
zations both consume and provide resources (e.g.,
PlanetLab), careful allocation can effectively in-
crease capacity by providing assurances to reluctant
organizations that contributions will be returned in
kind.
However, resource allocation remains a difficult
problem. The key challenges for resource allocation
in distributed systems are: strategic users who act
in their own interests, a rapidly changing and un-
predictable demand, and hundreds or thousands of
unreliable hosts that are physically and administra-
tively distributed.
Our approach is to incorporate an economicmech-
anism [16] (e.g., an auction) into the resource al-
location system. Systems without such mechanisms
[29, 6, 34] typically assume that task values (i.e.,
their importance) are the same, or are inversely
proportional to the resources required, or are set
by an omniscient administrator. However, in many
cases, task values vary significantly, are not cor-
related to resource requirements, and are difficult
and time-consuming for an administrator to set.
Instead, market-based resource allocation systems
[31, 10, 33, 5] rely on users to set the values of
their own jobs and provide a mechanism to encour-
age users to truthfully reveal those values.
Despite these advantages, we are not aware of any
currently operational market-based resource alloca-
tion systems for computational resources. We believe
one key impediment is that previously proposed sys-
tems impose a significant burden on users: frequent
interactive bidding, or, conversely, infrequent bid-
ding that increases the latency to acquire resources.
Most users would prefer to run their program as
they would without a market-based system and for-
get about it until it is done. The latency to acquire
resources is important for applications like a web
server that needs to allocate resources quickly in
reaction to unexpected events (e.g., breaking news
stories from CNN). In addition, many market-based
systems rely on a centralized market that limits re-
liability and scalability.
In this paper, we present the Tycoon distributed,
market-based resource allocation system. Each pro-
viding Tycoon host runs an auctioneer process that
multiplexes the local physical resources for one or
more virtual hosts (using Linux VServers [2]). As a
result, if an auctioneers fails, users can still acquire
resources at other hosts. Clients request resources
from auctioneers using continuous bids that can be
as infrequent as the user wishes while still allowing
immediate acquisition of resources.
The contribution of this paper is the design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of Tycoon. We describe a
prototype implementation of our design running on a
22-host cluster distributed between Palo Alto in Cal-
ifornia and Bristol in the United Kingdom. Tycoon
can reallocate all of the hosts in this cluster in less
than 30 seconds. We show that Tycoon encourages
efficient usage of resources even when users make no
explicit bids at all. We show that Tycoon provides
these benefits with little overhead. Running a typi-
cal task on a Tycoon host incurs a less than a 5%
overhead compared to an identical non-Tycoon host.
Using our current modest server infrastructure (450
MHz x86 CPU, 100 MB/s Ethernet), limited tests
indicate that our current design scales to 500 hosts
and 24 simultaneous active users (or any other com-
bination with a product of 12,000). The main limita-
tion of this implementation is that it only manages
CPU cycles (not memory, disk, etc.), but we expect
to resolve this by upgrading the virtualization soft-
ware.
The paper is organized as follows. In § 2, we give
an overview of the Tycoon design. In § 3, we describe
the Tycoon architecture in detail. In § 4, we present
the results of experiments using the Tycoon system.
In § 5, we review related work in resource allocation.
We describe some extensions to the basic design in
§ 6 and conclude in § 7.
2 Design Overview
In this section, we present the service model and
interface that Tycoon provides to users. We describe
the architecture of Tycoon in more detail in § 3.
2.1 Service Model Abstraction
The purpose of Tycoon is to allocate compute re-
sources like CPU cycles, memory, network band-
width, etc. to users in an economically efficient way.
In other words, the resources are allocated to the
users who value them the most. To give users an
incentive to truthfully reveal how much they value
resources, users use a limited budget of credits to bid
for resources. The form of a bid is (h, r, b, t), where
h is the host to bid on, r is the resource type, b is
the number of credits to bid, and t is the time in-
terval over which to bid. This bid says, “I’d like as
much of r on h as possible for t seconds of usage, for
which I’m willing to pay b”. This is a continuous bid
in that it is in effect until cancelled or user runs out
of money.
The user submits this bid to the auctioneer that
runs on host h. This auctioneer calculates bri /t
r
i for
each bid i and resource r and allocates its resources
in proportion to the bids. This is a “best-effort” al-
location in that the allocation may change as other
bids change, applications start and stop, etc. Credits
are not spent at the time of the bid; the user must
utilize the resource to burn the credits. To do this,
a user uses ssh to run a program. The t seconds of
usage can be used immediately or later and at the
same time or in pieces, as the user wishes.
Note that the auctioneers are completely indepen-
dent and do not share information. As a result, if a
user requires resources on two separate hosts, it is
his responsibility to send bids to those two markets.
Also, markets for two different resources on the same
host are separate.
This service model has two advantages. First, the
continuous bid allows user agents to express more so-
phisticated preferences because they can place differ-
ent bids in different markets. Specific auctioneers can
differentiate themselves in a wide variety of ways.
For example, an auctioneer could have more of a
resource (e.g. more CPU cycles), better quality-of-
service (e.g., a guaranteed minimum number of CPU
cycles), a favorable network location, etc. A user
agent can compose bids however it sees fit to sat-
isfy user preferences. Second, since the auctioneers
push responsibility for expressing sophisticated bids
onto user agents, the core infrastructure can remain
efficient, scalable, secure, and reliable. The efficiency
and scalability are a result of using only local infor-
mation to manage local resources and operating over
very simple bids. The security and reliability are a
result of independence between different auctioneers.
2.2 Interface
In this section, we describe how a user uses the sys-
tem. The interface requirments are important be-
cause we believe the bidding requirements of previ-
ous economic systems were burdensome for users.
Table 2.2 lists the main Tycoon user com-
mands. These are currently implemented as a Linux
command-line tool, but they could easily be imple-
mented in a graphical user interface. The first action
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Command Action
tycoon create_account host0 10 10 10 Create an account on host0 with a bid of 10 initial credits
for CPU cycles, memory, and disk.
tycoon fund host0 cpu 90 1000 Fund the account on host0 using 90 credits to be spent
over 1000 seconds for CPU cycles.
tycoon set_interval host0 cpu 2000 Change bid interval on the account to 2000 for CPU cycles.
tycoon get_status host0 Get status of account including the current balance, cur-
rent interval, etc. for each of the resources.
Table 1: This table shows the main Tycoon user commands.
a user takes is to create an account on a providing
host. This notifies auctioneers that a user intends to
bid on that host and makes an initial bid. The bid
interval defaults to 10,000,000 seconds so that the
user is unlikely to run out of money. Account cre-
ation only needs to be done rarely (in most cases
once) per user and host. Users usually perform ac-
count creation, like the operations that follow, on
many hosts, so the command-line tool allows the
same operation to be performed on multiple hosts
in parallel.
At this point, the user can ssh into hosts and run
his application. Users are not required to change
their bids when they start and stop tasks. They
can do so to optimize their resource usage, if they
wish. However, the auctioneers will still deduct cred-
its when he runs. As a result, users who run in-
frequently will get more resources than those who
run continuously. If the user chooses, he can trans-
fer more money to his account and/or change the
bidding interval. He might have a critical task for
which he is willing to spend credits at a higher rate,
or, conversely, he might have a very low priority job,
for which he wishes to decrease his spending rate.
The key point is that the users are relieved from any
mandatory interaction with the system.
3 Architecture
Tycoon is split into the following components: ser-
vice location service (SLS), bank, auctioneer, and
agent. The design of the SLS and bank are not novel,
but we describe them here because they are neces-
sary components for a working implementation.
3.1 Service Location Service
Auctioneers use the service location service to adver-
tise resources, and agents use it to locate resources
(as shown in steps 1 and 2 in Figure 1). Our pro-
totype uses a simple centralized soft-state server,
but the other components would work just as well
with more sophisticated and scalable service loca-
tion systems (e.g., Ganglia [19] and SWORD [21]).
Auctioneers register their status with the SLS every
30 seconds and the SLS de-registers any auctioneer
that has not contacted it within the past 120 sec-
onds. This status consists of the total amount bid
on the host for each resource, the total amount of
each resource type available (e.g., CPU speed, mem-
ory size, disk space), etc. The status is cryptograph-
ically signed by the auctioneer and includes the auc-
tioneer’s public key. Clients store this key and use it
to authenticate the results of later queries and also
to authenticate direct communications with the auc-
tioneer.
The soft-state design allows the system to be ro-
bust against many forms of hardware and software
failures. The querying agents may receive stale infor-
mation from the SLS, but they will receive updated
information if they elect to contact an auctioneer
directly.
3.2 Bank
The bank maintains account balances for all users
and providers. Its main task is to transfer funds from
a client’s account to a provider’s account (shown in
step 3 in Figure 1).
We assume that the bank has a well-known pub-
lic key and that the bank has the public keys of all
the users. These are the same requirements for any
user to securely use a host with or without a market-
based resource allocation system. We further assume
roughly synchronized clocks. In describing the trans-
fer protocol, we use Alice and Bob as the fictional
example sender and receiver. Alice begins by sending
a message to the bank as follows:
Alice, Bob, amount, time,
SignAlice(Alice, Bob, amount, time)
SignAlice is the DSA signature function using Alice’s
private key. The bank verifies that the signature is
correct, which implies that the message is from Alice,
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Figure 1: This figure gives an overview of how the Tycoon components interact.
that the funds are for Bob, and that the amount
and time are as specified. The bank keeps a list of
recent messages and verifies that this message is new,
thus guarding against replay attacks. Assuming this
is all correct and the funds are available, the bank
transfers amount from Alice to Bob and responds
with the following message (the receipt):
Alice, Bob, amount, time,
SignBank(Alice, Bob, amount, time)
The bank sends the same time as in the first mes-
sage. Alice verifies that the amount, time, and recip-
ient are the same as the original message and that
the signature is correct. Assuming the verification
is successful, Alice forwards this message to Bob as
described in § 3.3. Bob keeps a list of recent receipts
and verifies that this receipt is new, thus guarding
against replay attacks.
The advantages of this scheme are simplicity, ef-
ficiency, and prevention of counterfeiting. Micro-
currency systems are generally complex, have high
overhead, and only discourage counterfeiting. The
disadvantages of this approach are scalability and
vulnerability to compromise of the bank. However,
bank operations are relatively infrequent (see § 3.3.2
for how bids can be changed without involving the
bank), so scalability is not a critical issue for moder-
ate numbers of users and hosts, as we show in § 4.4.
The vulnerability to compromise of the bank could
be a problem and we discuss possible solutions in
§ 6.
3.3 Auctioneer
Auctioneers serve four main purposes: management
of local resources, collection of bids from users, al-
location of resources to users according to their
bids, and advertisment of the availability of local
resources.
3.3.1 Virtualization
To manage resources, an auctioneer relies on a virtu-
alization system and a local allocation system. Our
implementation uses Linux VServer (with modifi-
cations from PlanetLab) for virtualization. VServer
provides each user with a separate file system and
gives the appearance that he is the sole user of a ma-
chine, even if the physical hardware is being shared.
The user accesses this virtual machine by using ssh.
VServers virtualize at the system call level, which
provides the advantage of low overhead. We show in
§ 4.3 that the total auctioneer overhead, including
VServers, is at most ten percent and usually much
less. Systems that virtualize at the hardware level
like VMWare [3] or Disco [7] have significantly more
overhead [12].
For local allocation, Tycoon uses the plkmod pro-
portional share scheduler [6], which implements the
standard proportional share scheduling abstraction
[28]. The disadvantage of VServers and plkmod is
that they do not completely virtualize system re-
sources. This is why Tycoon currently only manages
CPU cycles. In § 6 we discuss new virtualization and
allocation systems that provide this functionality.
3.3.2 Setting Bids
The second purpose of auctioneers is to collect bids
from users. Auctioneers store bids as two parts for
each user: the local account balance, and the bidding
interval. The local balance is the amount of money
the user has remaining locally. The bidding interval
specifies the number of seconds over which to spend
the local balance. Users have two methods of chang-
ing this information: fund and set_interval. fund
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transfers money from the user’s bank account to the
auctioneer’s bank account, and conveys that fact to
the auctioneer. It has the disadvantage that it re-
quires significant latency (100 ms) and it requires
communication with the bank, which may be offline
or overloaded. set_interval sets the bidding inter-
val at the auctioneer without changing the local bal-
ance. It only requires direct communication between
the client and the auctioneer, so it provides a low
latency method of adjusting the bid until the local
balance is exhausted.
In describing the fund protocol, we again use Alice
and Bob as examples. We assume that Alice and Bob
already have each other’s public keys and that Alice
has the value nonceAlice. A nonce is a unique token
which Bob has never seen from Alice before. In the
current implementation it is an increasing counter.
First, Alice gets a bank receipt as described above.
She then sends the following message to Bob:
Alice, Bob, nonceAlice, interval, receipt,
SignAlice(Alice, Bob, nonceAlice, interval, receipt)
The nonce allows Bob to detect replay attacks. Bob
verifies that he is the recipient of this message, that
the nonce has not been used before, that the receipt
specifies that Alice has transferred money into his
account, that the bank has correctly signed the re-
ceipt, and that Alice has correctly signed this mes-
sage. Assuming this is all correct, Bob increases Al-
ice’s local balance by the amount specified in the
receipt and sets Alice’s bidding interval to interval.
set_interval is identical, except that it does not
include the bank receipt.
The key advantage of separating fund and
set_interval is that it reduces the frequency of
bank operations. Users only have to fund their hosts
when they wish to change the set of hosts they are
running on or when they receive income. For most
users and applications, we believe this is on the or-
der of days, not seconds. Between fundings, users can
modify their bids by changing the bidding interval,
as described in the next section.
3.3.3 Allocating Resources
The third and most important purpose of auction-
eers is to use virtualization and the users’ bids to
allocate resources among the users and account for
usage. Although our current implementation only al-
locates CPU cycles because of virtualization limita-
tions, the following applies to both rate-based (e.g.,
CPU cycles and network bandwidth) and space-
based (e.g., physical memory and disk space) re-
sources. In addition, we initially describe a propor-
tional share-based function, but there are other allo-
cation functions with desirable properties (e.g., Gen-
eralized Vickrey Auctions, described below).
For each user i, the auctioneer knows the local bal-
ance bi and the bidding interval ti. The auctioneer
calculates the bid as bi/ti. Consider a resource with
total size R (e.g., the number of cycles per second
of the CPU or the total disk space) over some pe-
riod P . The allocation function for ri, the amount
of resource allocated to user i over P , is
ri =
bi
ti∑n−1
j=0
bj
tj
R.
Let qi be the amount of the resource that i actually
consumes during P , then the amount that i pays per
second is
si = min
(
qi
ri
, 1
)
bi
ti
.
This allows users who do not use their full allocation
to pay less than their bid, but in no case will a user
pay more than his bid.
There are a variety of implementation details.
First, the auctioneer gets the number of cycles used
by each user from the kernel to determine if qi < ri.
Second, we set P = 10s, so the auctioneer charges
users and recomputes their bids every 10 seconds.
This value is a compromise between the overhead
of running the auctioneer and the latency in chang-
ing the auctioneer’s allocation. With tighter integra-
tion with the kernel and the virtualization system,
P could be as small as the scheduling interval (10ms
on most systems). Third, users whose bids are too
small relative to the other users are logged off the
system. Users who bid for less than .1% of the re-
source would run infrequently while still consuming
overhead for context-switching, accounting, etc., so
the auctioneer logs them off, starting with the small-
est bidder.
The advantages of this allocation function (3.3.3)
are that it is simple, it can be computed in O(n)
time, where n is the number of bidders, it is fair,
and it can be optimized across multiple auctioneers
by an agent (described in § 3.4). It is fair in the sense
that all users who use their entire allocation pay the
same per unit of the resource.
The disadvantage is that it is not strategyproof. In
the simple case of one user running on a host, that
user’s best (or dominant) strategy is to make the
smallest possible bid, which would still provide the
entire host’s resources. If there are multiple users,
then the user’s dominant strategy is to bid his val-
uation. Since, the user’s dominant strategy depends
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on the actions of others, this mechanism is not strat-
egyproof. One possible strategyproof mechanism is a
Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) [30]. However,
this requires O(n2) time, it is not fair in the sense
described above, and it is not clear how to optimize
bidding across multiple GVA auctioneers.
3.3.4 Advertising Availability
The auctioneer must advertise the availability of lo-
cal resources so that user agents can decide whether
to place bids. For each resource available on the lo-
cal host, the auctioneer advertises the total amount
available, and the total amount spent at the last al-
location. In other words, the auctioneer reports
n−1∑
j=0
si.
This may be less than the sum of the bids because
some tasks did not use their entire allocation. We
report this instead of the sum of the bids because it
allows the agent to more accurately predict the cost
of resources (as required the algorithm described in
§ 3.4.1). Note that this information allows agents to
make appropriate bids without revealing the exact
amounts of other users’ individual bids. Revealing
that information would allow users to know each
other’s valuations, which would allow gaming the
auctions.
3.4 Agent
The role of a tycoon agent is to interpret a user’s
preferences, examine the state of the system, make
bids appropriately, and verify that the resources
were provided. The agent is involved in steps 2, 3,
4, and 6 of Figure 1. Given the diversity of possible
preferences, we chose to separate agents from the in-
frastructure to allow agents to evolve independently.
This is a similar approach to the end-to-end prin-
ciple used in the design of the Internet [8, 11, 24],
where application-specific functionality is contained
in the end-points instead of in the infrastructure.
This allows the infrastructure to be efficient, while
supporting a wide variety of applications.
There are a wide variety of preferences that a user
can specify to his agent. Tycoon provides for both
high-level preferences that an agent interprets and
low-level preferences that users must specify in de-
tail. Examples of high level preferences are want-
ing to maximize the expected number of CPU cy-
cles or to seek machines with a minimum amount of
memory, or some combination of those preferences.
Tycoon allows uncertainty in the exact amount of
resource received because other applications on the
same host may not use their allocation and/or other
users may change their bids.
3.4.1 Best Response Algorithm
In a system with many machines, it is very difficult
for users to bid on individual machines to maximize
their utilization of the system. In Tycoon, we allow
the user to only specify the total bids, or the budget,
he is willing to spend and let the agent compute the
bids on the machines to maximize the user’s utility.
In order to compute the optimum bids, the agent
must first know the user’s utility as a function of
the fraction of the machines assigned to the user.
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to figure out
the exact formulation of the utility function, we as-
sume a linear utility function for each user. That is,
each user specifies a non-negative weight for each
machine to express his preference of the machine.
Such a weight is chosen by the user and determined
mainly by two factors: the system configuration and
the user’s need. They may vary from user to user.
For example, one user may have higher weight on
machine A because it has more memory, and an-
other user may have higher weight on B because it
has a faster CPU. The weights are kept private to
the users.
Now, suppose that there are n machines, and a
user has weight wi on machine i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If the
user gets fraction ri from machine i, then his utility
is
U =
n∑
i=1
wiri .
The agent’s goal is to maximize the user’s utility
under a given budget, say X , and the others’ aggre-
gated bids on the machines. Suppose that yi is the
total bid by other users on machine i. The user’s
share on i is then xixi+yi if he bids xi on machine
i. Therefore, the agent needs to solve the following
optimization problem:
maximize
n∑
i=1
wi
xi
xi + yi
, s.t.
xi ≥ 0 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
n∑
i=1
xi = X .
This optimization problem can be solved by using
the following algorithm.
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1. sort wiyi in decreasing order, and suppose that
w1
y1
≥ w2
y2
≥ · · · ≥ wn
yn
.
2. compute the largest k such that
√
wkyk∑k
j=1
√
wjyj
(X +
k∑
j=1
yj)− yk ≥ 0 .
3. set xi = 0 for i > k, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, set
xi =
√
wiyi∑k
j=1
√
wjyj
(X +
k∑
j=1
yj)− yi .
The above algorithm takesO(n log n) time as sort-
ing is the most expensive step. It is derived by using
Lagrangian multiplier method. Intuitively, the opti-
mum is achieved by the bids where the bid on each
machine has the same marginal value. The challenge
is to select the machines to bid on. Roughly speak-
ing, one should prefer to bid on a machine if it has
high weight on the machine and if other’s bids on
that machine is low. That is the intuition behind
the first sorting step. We omit the correctness proof
of the algorithm due to the space limitation.
One problem with the above algorithm is that it
spends the entire budget. In the situation when there
are already heavy bids on the machines, it might
be wise to save the money for later use. To deal
with the problem, a variation is to also prescribe a
threshold λ to the agent and require that the margin
on each machine is not lower than λ, in addition to
the budget constraint. Such problem can be solved
by an easy adaptation of the algorithm.
3.4.2 Predictability
Instead of maximizing its expected value, some
applications may prefer to maintain a minimum
amount of a resource. An example of this is mem-
ory, where an application will swap pages to disk
if it has less physical memory than some minimum,
but few applications benefit significantly from hav-
ing more than that. Tycoon allows agents to express
this preference by putting larger bids on fewer ma-
chines. Let R be the total resource size on a host
and B be the sum of the users’ bids for the resource,
excluding user i. From (3.3.3), the user i’s agent can
compute that to get ri of a resource, it should bid
bi =
riB
R− ri .
However, this only provides an expected amount
of ri. To provide higher assurances of having this
amount, the agent bids more than bi. To determine
how much more, the agent maintains a history of the
bids at that host to determine the likelihood that a
particular bid will result in obtaining the required
amount of a resource. Assuming that the application
only uses ri of the resource, the user will pay more
per unit of the resource than if his agent had just
bid bi (see § 3.3.3), but that is the price of having
more predictability.
3.4.3 Scalability
Since the computational overhead of the agent is low,
the main scalability concern is communications over-
head. When making bids, a user agent may have to
contact a large number of auctioneers, possibly re-
sulting in a large queueing delay. For example, to
use 100 hosts, the agent must send 100 messages.
Although the delay to do this is proportional to the
amount of resources the user is using, for very large
numbers of hosts and a slow and/or poorly con-
nected agent host, the delay may be excessive. In
this case, the agent can use an application-layer mul-
ticast service (e.g., Bullet [17]) to reduce the delay.
Since changing a bid consists of simply setting an in-
terval, the user agent can use a multicast service to
send out the same interval to multiple auctioneers.
This would essentially make the communication de-
lays logarithmic with respect to number of hosts.
3.4.4 Verification
One potential problem with all auction-based sys-
tems is that auctioneers may cheat by charging
more for resources than the rules of the auction dic-
tate. However, one advantage of Tycoon is that it
is market-based so users will eventually find more
cost-effective auctioneers. Cost-effectiveness is an
application-specific metric. For example, an appli-
cation may prefer a slow host because it has a favor-
able network location. Users who are interested in
CPU cycles would view that as a host with poor
cost-effectiveness. However, in many applications,
the agent can measure cost-effectiveness fairly ac-
curately. As an example, the rendering application
we use in § 4 uses frames rendered per second as its
utility metric. As a result, the cost-effectiveness is
frames rendered per second per credit spent for each
host.
The measured cost-effectiveness is then used as
the host weight for the best-response algorithm. This
algorithm will automatically drop a host from bid-
ding when it sees that it is significantly less cost-
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effective than the others. Effectively, Tycoon treats
a cheating host as a host with poor cost-effectiveness.
Therefore we do need sophisticated techniques to de-
tect or prevent cheating. If no agents wants to spend
credits at a cheating auctioneer, the monetary incen-
tive to cheat is greatly reduced.
3.5 Funding Policy
Funding policy determines how users obtain funds.
We define open loop and closed loop funding poli-
cies. In an open loop funding policy, users are funded
at some regular rate. The system administrators
set their income rate based on exogenously deter-
mined priorities. Providers accumulate funds and re-
turn them to the system administrators. In a closed
loop (or peer-to-peer) funding policy, users them-
selves bring resources to the system when they join.
They receive an initial allotment of funds, but they
do not receive funding grants after joining. Instead,
they must earn funds by enticing other users to pay
for their resources. A closed loop funding policy is
preferable because it encourages service providers to
provide desirable resources and therefore should re-
sult in higher economic efficiency.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
The experiments in this section were run the on the
hosts shown in Table 4.1. A were running Linux with
the PlanetLab 2.4.22 kernel, which includes VServer
and plkmod.
4.2 Agility
In this section, we report the results of experiments
to test agility, the ability to adapt to changes in de-
mand. As a workload, we used the Maya 6.0 image
rendering software to renderer frames in a movie
scene. The jobs were dispatched using the Muster
job queue, an off-the-shelf product that manages dis-
tributed rendering jobs. During the experiment two
users were rendering concurrently on each node.
First, we examine the time for a user to acquire
more resources to finish his rendering job sooner. In
Figure 2, a user has initialized his nodes with $10 to
be spent over 30,000 seconds. He submits a 200 frame
rendering job to the Tycoon cluster. Someone else is
already running on the cluster. Using the bids of
both users, auctioneers allocate the new user about
twenty percent of each node. After running for three
minutes, the user notices that the job is not likely
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Figure 2: This figure shows a user increasing his share
at 190 seconds by decreasing the bidding interval. As a
result, the throughput increases by 210 seconds.
to finish early enough, so he changes the spending
interval to 300 seconds on all nodes. This will leave
him with fewer credits at the end of the run than if
he left the interval at 30,000, but it is worth it to him.
The time at when he changes the interval is marked
by the left vertical line. About twenty seconds later,
the right vertical line marks the time at which the
user is able to detect an increased rate of rendering.
Afterward, the frames finish at an increased speed,
and the job finishes on time.
This demonstrates the system’s ability to quickly
reallocate resources. As in this case, this could be
because a user cannot accurately estimate the re-
source requirements of his application. Other possi-
ble causes are that hosts have failed, the load has
increased, the user’s deadline has changed, etc. The
agility of the system allows users to compensate for
uncertainty.
In a second experiment, we examine the system’s
ability to change allocations when a high priority
job is started. In this scenario, two users are render-
ing on the cluster. One user performs a low priority
render, and he funds his nodes with $10 for 100,000
seconds. A second user funds his nodes with $10 for
10,000 seconds. Initially, only the low priority job
is running, but after 220 seconds, the second user
submits a rendering job to the system.
Figure 3 shows the average rate at which frames
are finished for the two jobs. First the low priority
job runs alone, at an average rate of 1.1 frames per
second. When second users submits the high priority
job, (marked with a vertical line in the figure), the
throughput of the low priority job decreases almost
immediately to 0.2 frames per second, and the high
priority job starts to render at 0.9 frames per second.
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Processor Variety CPU Memory Disk # nodes Location
Pentium III 1 GHz 2 GB 32 GB SCSI 4 US
Mobile Pentium III 900 MHz 512 MB 40 GB IDE 8 UK
Pentium III 550 MHz 256 MB 10 GB IDE 2 US
Pentium II 450 MHz 128 MB 10 GB IDE 6 UK
Table 2: Specifications of the four types of computers used in the test cluster.
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Figure 3: This figure shows a low priority job with a
small share getting lower throughput when a high prior-
ity job arrives.
As soon as the high priority job finishes, the low
priority job starts to utilize the CPUs again, and
gets an increased throughput.
When high priority job first starts, it has lower
throughput because it is waiting for disk I/O. During
that time, the low priority job is able to continue to
utilize the CPU. As soon as the high priority job
is ready to run, it produces frames at almost full
speed. Based on the bids, its share is 90%. The actual
throughput is on average 0.9/1.1, which is slightly
lower. This is also because of disk I/O delays. The
throughput penalty from I/O is higher for the high
priority task than for the low priority task because
it issues more I/O operations. This is an artifact of
our version of VServer being unable to regulate disk
I/O bandwidth. If our virtualization layer had that
capability, the actual throughput would be closer to
the ideal of 90%.
In the third experiment, we show how the system
treats a user who runs infrequently in comparison to
one that runs continously. Both users initialize their
nodes with $10 for 300 seconds. One user starts a
long continuous job on the cluster. While the user is
running alone, his share decreases in proportion to
(1 − P/ti)τ/P where τ is the time since the start of
the experiment, ti = 300 is the funding interval, and
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Figure 4: This figure shows how a user that runs infre-
quently can receive more resources when he does run in
comparison to a user that runs continuously.
P = 10 is the auctioneers’ update interval. Since the
infrequent user is not running, the continuous job
initially gets to use the whole cluster, as shown in
Figure 4.
After 400 seconds, the infrequent user starts run-
ning. Since it has not spent any money, it’s share is
75 percent, and the job that has been running has a
25 percent share. Since both jobs continue to pay in
proportion to their balance, their shares remain at 75
and 25 percent, respectively, until the infrequnt users
stops running. The infrequent user returns at 1300
seconds and again he gets most of the resources. In
this case, he gets most of the resources because the
continuous user’s share has dropped considerably.
The key point about this result is that the system
encourages efficient usage of resources even when
users do not make explicit bids. In this experiment,
the users bids were identical, which could have been
set when their accounts were created. Despite this,
the infrequent user is rewarded for being judicious in
his resource consumption, while the continuous user
is penalized for running all the time. In comparison,
a proportional share system would allocate 50% of
the resources to each user when both are running.
This gives no disincentive for the continuous user
to stop running. The performance improvement for
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Figure 5: System Call Performance
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Figure 6: CPU-bound Task Performance
the infrequent user is (.75 − .50)/.50 = 50% for one
continuous user. For n continuous users, the perfor-
mance improvement is (.75 − (1/n))/(1/n), which
goes to infinity as n goes to infinity.
4.3 Host Overhead
This set of experiments measures the overhead in-
curred by using Tycoon rather than using the same
Linux computer without Tycoon. This overhead in-
cludes VServer, plkmod, and the auctioneer over-
head. We compared this relative performance for
three distinct types of operations. They are illus-
trated in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 for system call over-
head, CPU-bound computation, disk reading and
disk writing, respectively. In these experiments, from
one to eight programs designed to test a particular
type of operation are invoked simultaneously by ssh.
For the Tycoon experiments, each program is started
as a distinct user. In the root scenario, the programs
are all run as root. The sum of the scores of all of
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Figure 7: Disk Read Performance
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Figure 8: Disk Write Performance
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Operation SLS Bank Auc. Agent
Registration (per min.) 260 9634
SLS query (20 hosts) 89K 311
Bank transfer 1198 610
Account creation 5901 3592
Spending rate change 793 719
Table 3: Bytes sent from the specified entity while
conducting the specified operation.
the concurrent processes is plotted as a function of
the number of concurrent processes.
For CPU-bound processes and for a few I/O-
bound processes, Tycoon has less than five percent
overhead. We expect the bulk of cluster applications
to be similar to these micro-benchmarks. For pro-
cesses that involve many system calls, the overhead
is capped at ten percent, but we do not expect many
Tycoon processes to be system call-heavy. The over-
head for Tycoon is most significant for many disk
reading processes. This may be due to the additional
memory overhead of VServer reducing the size of the
buffer cache, but we are still investigating this.
4.4 Network Overhead
The primary bottlenecks that prevent the unfettered
scaling of a Tycoon cluster are the two centralized
servers, the service location server (SLS) and the
bank. Table 3 quantifies the costs of performing the
most common operations on a Tycoon cluster.
The most frequent process is the maintenance of
soft-state between the auctioneers and the SLS. As-
suming that the SLS is allowed to use 100Mb/s net-
work bandwidth (e.g., it is on a 1Gb/s network), it
can manage up to 75,000 Tycoon hosts. If clients use
the best response agent to operate on the Tycoon
cluster, they must issue repeated host-list queries to
the SLS to compute their optimal bidding strategy. If
the agent updates its strategy once a minute, it costs
roughly 4KB/minute per agent per host. Again as-
suming this task is allocated 100Mb/s of bandwidth,
the product of the number of agents and number of
hosts must not exceed 187M. Hence assuming that
there are 75K hosts in the cluster, there may be up to
2500 agents running concurrently. Similarly if there
are only 2500 hosts, there may be up to 75K agents.
A less frequent operation is bank transfers from
users to hosts. This task depends less on bandwidth
and more on the speed of the bank system in per-
forming large integer arithmetic for authentication.
On a 450 MHz Pentium III, this operation requires
an average of 100ms. Assuming user perform bank
operations every twenty minutes per user per host,
this bank supports an active user-host product of
12,000, which would allow 24 simultaneous active
users on a 500 host cluster. As a result, for the im-
mediate future, we do not believe a centralized bank
is a significant problem. One reason is that much
faster hardware is available. A 3 GHz bank should
support 6.7 times the number of users or hosts or
combination thereof. Another reason is that the cur-
rent protocol performs only one credit transfer per
connection. It could be optimized to perform mul-
tiple transfers per connection which would amor-
tize the authentication and communication costs. Fi-
nally, twenty minutes is a very conservative estimate
of bank operations. A more likely frequency is once
a day. This would allow even the current slow hard-
ware and unoptimized protocol to support a user-
host product of 864000. A centralized bank is not
likely to limit scalability in practice.
5 Related Work
In this section, we describe related work in resource
allocation. There are two main groups: those that in-
corporate an economic mechanism1, and those that
do not.
One of the key non-economic abstractions for re-
source allocation is a computer science context is
Proportional Share (PS), originally documented by
Tijdeman [28]. Each PS process i has a weight wi.
The share of a resource that process i receives over
some interval t where n processes are running is
wi
n−1∑
j=0
wj
. (1)
PS maximizes utilization because it always provides
resources to needy processes. One problem is that
PS is usually applied by giving each user a weight
and directly transferring that weight to the user’s
processes. However, a user may not weigh all of his
processes equally and PS does not give an incentive
for users to differentiate his processes. As a result,
as a system becomes more loaded, the low value pro-
cesses consume more resources, until the high value
processes cannot make useful progress (as shown by
Lai, et al. [18]).
One common method for dealing with this prob-
lem is to rely on social mechanisms to set the PS
weights appropriately. A system administrator could
set them based on input from users or users could
1By mechanism we mean the system that provides an
incentive for users to reveal the truth (e.g., an auction)
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“horse trade” high weights amongst themselves. Al-
though these mechanisms work well for small groups
of people that trust each other, they do not scale to
larger groups and they have a high overhead in user
time.
Most recent work by Waldspurger and Weihl [32],
Stoica, et al. [25], and Nieh, et al. [20] on PS has
focused on computationally efficient and fair imple-
mentations. Lottery scheduling [32] is a PS-based ab-
straction that is similar to the economic approach in
that processes are issued tickets that represent their
allocations. Sullivan and Seltzer [27] extend this to
allow processes to barter these tickets. Although this
work provides the software infrastructure for an eco-
nomic mechanism it does not provide the mechanism
itself.
Similarly, SHARP (described by Fu, et al. [14])
provides the distributed infrastructure to manage
tickets, but not the mechanism or agent strategies.
In addition, SHARP and work by Urgaonkar, et al.
[29] use an overbooking resource abstraction instead
of PS. An overbooking system promises probabilis-
tic resources to applications. Tycoon uses a similar
abstraction for applications that require a minimum
amount of a resource.
Another class of non-economic algorithms exam-
ine resource allocation from a scheduling (surveyed
by Pindedo [23]) perspective using combinatorial op-
timization (described by Papadimitriou and Steiglitz
[22]) or by examining the resource consumption of
tasks (a recent example is work by Wierman and
Harchol-Balter [34]). However, these assume that the
values and resource consumption of tasks are re-
ported accurately. This assumption does not apply
in the presense of strategic users. We view scheduling
and resource allocation as two separate functions.
Resource allocation divides a resource among differ-
ent users while scheduling takes a given allocation
and orders a user’s jobs.
Examples the economic approach are Spawn (by
Waldspurger, et al. [31]), work by Stoica, et al. [26].,
the Millennium resource allocator (by Chun, et al.
[10]), work by Wellman, et al. [33], and Bellagio (by
AuYoung, et al. [5]).
Spawn and the work by Wellman, et al. uses a
reservation abstraction similar to the way airline
seats are allocated. Although reservations allow low
risk, the utilization is also low because some tasks do
not use their entire reservations. Service applications
(e.g., web serving, database serving, and overlay
network routing) result in particularly low utiliza-
tion because they typically have bursty and unpre-
dictable loads. Another problem with reservations is
that they can significantly increase the latency to ac-
quire resources. A reservation by one user prevents
another user from using the resources for the dura-
tion of the reservation, even if the new user is willing
to pay much more for the resources than the first
user. Reservations are typically on the order of min-
utes or hours (Spawn used 15 minutes), which is too
much delay for a highly bursty and unpredictable
application like web serving.
The proportional share abstraction used in the
Millennium resource allocator comes the closest to
that used in Tycoon. We extend that abstraction
with continuous bids, the best-response agent algo-
rithm, and secure protocols for bidding.
Bellagio uses a centralized allocator called SHARE
developed by Chun, et al. [9]. SHARE takes the
combinatorial auction approach to resource alloca-
tion. This allows users to express preferences with
complementarities like wanting host A and host B,
but not wanting host A without B or B without A.
The combinatorial auction approach relies on a cen-
tralized auctioneer to guarantee that the user either
gets both A and B or else nothing. Economic the-
ory predicts that solving this NP-complete problem
provides an allocation with optimal economic effi-
ciency. Tycoon addresses the combinatorial problem
in a possibly less economically efficient, but more
scalable way. In Tycoon, credits are only spent when
the user actually consumes resources, so the user’s
agent can see that it only has A before his applica-
tion runs and thereby prevent wasting credits on an
unvalued resource. The disadvantages of the combi-
natorial auction approach are the centralized auc-
tioneer and the difficulty of the combinatorial auc-
tion problem. The centralized auctioneer is vulner-
able to compromise and limits the scalability of the
system, especially since it must be involved in all al-
locations. Moreover, even computationally efficient
heuristic algorithms operate on the order of minutes,
while Tycoon reallocates in less than ten seconds.
Recent work by Hajiaghayi [15] on online resource
allocation may be able to reduce the delay of the
combinatorial approach.
6 Future Work
One area of future work is more complete virtualiza-
tion. Our prototype implementation uses early ver-
sions of VServer and plkmod which only support vir-
tualization of CPU cycles. Later versions of VServer,
Xen [12], and the Class-based Kernel Resource Man-
agement (CKRM) [4] support more complete virtu-
alization and should be relatively straight-forward
to integrate with Tycoon.
Another area of future work is to develop a scal-
12
able banking infrastructure. One possibility is to
physically distribute the bank without administra-
tively distributing it. The bank would consist of sev-
eral servers with independent account databases. A
user has accounts on some subset of the servers. A
user’s balance is split into separate balances on each
server. To make a transfer, users find a server where
both the payer and payee have an account and that
contains enough funds. The transfer proceeds as with
a centralized bank. Users should periodically redis-
tribute their funds among the servers to ensure that
one server failure will not prevent all payment.
7 Summary
An economic mechanism is vital for large-scale re-
source allocation. In this paper, we propose a dis-
tributed market where auctioneers only manage lo-
cal resources. A user’s agent sends separate bids to
these auctioneers, where each bid is for a single type
of resource at that host. The bids are continuous
bids in that they stay in effect until the user’s lo-
cal balance is depeleted. Resources are allocated to
users in proportion to their bids using a best-effort
model. Agents are responsible for optimizing their
users’ utility.
Using our prototype implementation, we show: 1)
continuous bids reduce the burden on users by allow-
ing them to run without frequent interactive bidding
while still making an efficient and low-latency allo-
cation; 2) distributed auctioneers result in very low
overhead for allocation; and 3) the best-response al-
gorithm can optimize across multiple markets.
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